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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal crop insurance program is a critical risk management tool for agricultural producers1 which also provides an important safety net for farmers.2 Crop
insurance seeks to protect against risks posed by adverse weather, drought, disease, 3
and especially assists newer farmers who face the risk of potentially being pushed
out of agriculture due to catastrophic events.4 In an era where bipartisanship is difficult to achieve, crop insurance has traditionally retained strong bipartisan support
from Democratic, as well as Republican, lawmakers.5 This point was recently reaffirmed through Congress’ strong support of Farm Bills in 20146 and 2018.7
Established in 1938 through the enactment of the Federal Crop Insurance Act, 8
the federal crop insurance program provides multi-peril crop insurance which is
sold and serviced through private insurance companies and reinsured by the federal
government.9 Multi-peril crop insurance policies cover a variety of risks ranging
from excessive wind to drought and frost.10 Coverage is available for well over 100
crops, including a variety of fruits and vegetables found at grocery stores and farmers markets, such, oranges, tomatoes, grapefruits, and apples among many others. 11
By contrast, “crop hail” insurance policies cover risk posed by only hail, which is
considered a particularly localized risk. These types of specialized policies are sold
and serviced by private insurance companies and therefore do not fall under the
umbrella of the federal crop insurance program.12
Arguably, the federal crop insurance program has been a vital in ensuring adequate and affordable food supply in the United States. As former Congressman

1. See Jeremy Forrett, Crop Insurance: An Important Risk Management Tool, FARM CREDIT EAST
(Mar. 10, 2020), available at https://www.farmcrediteast.com/knowledge-exchange/Blog/todays-harvest/crop-insurance-an-important-risk-management-tool (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
2. See Proven Safety Net for Growers – Success in Crop Insurance, Western Growers Magazine
(Sept. 2016), available at https://www.wga.com/magazine/2016/09/02/proven-safety-net-growers%E2%80%94success-crop-insurance (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
3. See Understanding Crop Insurance, Insurance Information Institute (2022), available at
https://www.iii.org/article/understanding-crop-insurance (last visited Jan. 28, 2022) (hereinafter “Insurance Information Institute”).
4. See Jason Alexander, A Strong Safety Net is Critical for All Farmers, FARM CREDIT MID-AMERICA
(June 15, 2017), available at https://e-farmcredit.com/insights/business-of-farming/strong-safety-netcritical-for-all-farmers (last visited Jan. 24, 2022).
5. See Erica Hunzinger, Which Side Are You On? When It Comes To Farm Bill Politics, The Lines
Blur, HARVEST PUBLIC MEDIA (Jan. 31, 2018), available at https://www.harvestpublicmedia.org/post/which-side-are-you-when-it-comes-farm-bill-politics-lines-blur (last accessed Jan. 24,
2022).
6. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, The 2014 Farm Bill: Lessons in Patience, Politics, and Persuasion, 19 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 1 (2014).
7. See generally Chad G. Marzen, The 2018 Farm Bill: Legislative Compromise in the Trump Era,
30 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 49 (2019).
8. See 7 U.S.C. § 1501 et. seq. (2022).
9. See Marion Nestle, The Exceedingly Strange World of Federal Crop Insurance Subsidies, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2012), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/04/the-exceedingly-strange-world-of-federal-crop-insurance-subsidies/255989/ (last accessed Jan. 28, 2022).
10. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 4.
11. See Specialty Crops, United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency (2022),
available at
https://www.rma.usda.gov/en/Topics/Specialty-Crops (last accessed Jan. 28, 2022).
12. See Insurance Information Institute, supra note 4.
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Luke Messer of Indiana stated in his remarks on the floor of the United States House
of Representatives on June 7, 2017:
Through the crop insurance program, insurers can extend coverage to
crops of all kind, providing farmers with the protections they need to do
what they do best: grow food. This program is an example of the government partnering with industry to offer an exceptionally valuable service
while maintaining a carefully limited Federal Government role. Frankly, it
should be used as a model for other Federal reinsurance programs. It is a
success story, and even if you are not a farmer, you have benefited from
its existence. It has helped you receive more affordable food and helped
America maintain its agricultural preeminence. That is a great result for
virtually every American.13
There are several instances in which an agricultural producer will face an adverse event, such as a frost or drought, which will necessitate the filing of an insurance claim. While many crop insurance claims are resolved without any major incident and without litigation, there are some cases where litigation will ensue. In
rare cases, an allegation will arise where a crop insurance claim is handled not only
improperly, but also recklessly and/or intentionally in disregard with the agricultural producer’s rights. Claims based upon insurance bad faith, which remain common in the realm of underinsured motorists coverage and automobile insurance, 14
life insurance,15 as well as health insurance,16 may also appear within the crop insurance industry.
This Article comprehensively analyzes the claims of, and insurer defenses to,
crop insurance bad faith claims. Section II of this Article provides a brief overview
of insurance bad faith liability. Section III discusses a taxonomy of crop insurance
bad faith claims and the types of fact patterns in which a crop insurance bad faith
claim may arise. Section IV examines possible defenses of insurers with crop insurance bad faith claims.
By analyzing state and federal caselaw which have addressed crop insurance
bad faith claims, the United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management
Agency’s Loss Adjustment Manual (LAM) Standards Handbook, and general legal
principles regarding insurance bad faith, policymakers, insurers, and producers can
better understand the complexity of crop insurance bad faith and the situations in
which it may arise.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE BAD FAITH LIABILITY
In order to better understand bad faith in the context of crop insurance, one
must be familiar with insurance bad faith in general. A policy underpinning insurance contracts is that an insurer owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to its

13. See 163 CONG. REC. H4656 (daily ed. June 7, 2017) (speech of Rep. Messer).
14. See e.g., In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 614 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. Ct. App.
2020).
15. See e.g., Folsom v. Century Life Assurance Company, Case No. 118,920, 2021 WL 5822785
(Okla. Ct. Civ. App. Dec. 8, 2021).
16. See e.g., Ex parte Simmons, 791 So.2d 371 (Ala. 2000).
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insured with regard to claims handling.17 Historically, one of the first courts to adopt
a cause of action for first party insurance bad faith was the California Supreme
Court in 1973 in the case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company.18 In Gruenberg, the Court held an insurer who “fails to deal fairly and in good faith with its
insured by refusing, without proper cause, to compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”19
Following the landmark decision made in Gruenberg, a number of jurisdictions
chose to adopt causes of action for insurance bad faith. It is important to note the
standard of proof for recovery on a bad faith claim varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, hold an action for bad faith
requires “(1) that the insurer did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits
under the policy and (2) that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded its lack of
reasonable basis in denying the claim.”20 Other jurisdictions, including Missouri,
require a “vexatious” refusal to pay.21
In a number of jurisdictions, first party bad faith claims sound in tort law. In
others, bad faith claims are statutory in nature.22 For example, Missouri has a statute
which provides for recovery by an insured against an insurer in case of a vexatious
refusal to pay.23 The statute provides: “If, the insurer has failed or refused for a
period of thirty days after due demand therefor prior to the institution of the action,
suit or proceeding, to make payment under and in accordance with the terms and
provisions of the contract of insurance, and it shall appear from the evidence that
the refusal was vexatious and without reasonable cause, the court or jury may, in
addition to the amount due under the provisions of the contract of insurance and
interest thereon, allow the plaintiff damages for vexatious refusal to pay and attorney’s fees.”24
A question thus arises as to what specific actions of an insurer may constitute
indicia of bad faith in claims handling. Florida has a first party insurance bad faith
statute which states bad faith is present in cases where an insurer acts in such a way
as to not attempt “in good faith to settle claims when, under all the circumstances,
it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward its insured
and with due regard for her or his interests.” 25
The following actions are listed as unfair claims settlement practices and thus
are actions constituting insurance bad faith:
Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application, when serving as a binder or intended to become a part of the policy, or any other
17. See Burgess v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, Case No. 03-20-00088-CV, 2021
WL 5498758 at *1 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021) (“Under the common law, an insurance company owes
a duty of good faith and fair dealing to its insured in its handling and processing of a claim for benefits”).
18. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Company, 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
19. Id. at 1037.
20. See Rancosky v. Washington National Insurance Company, 170 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2017).
21. See Hensley v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, 210 S.W.3d 455, 465-466 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D.
2007).
22. See generally Chad G. Marzen, Crop Insurance Bad Faith: Protection for America’s Farmers, 46
CREIGHTON L. REV. 619, 631.
23. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 375.296 (2022).
24. Id.
25. See Fla. Rev. Stat. 624.155(b)(1) (2022).
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material document which was altered without notice to, or knowledge or
consent of, the insured.26
A material misrepresentation made to an insured or any other person
having an interest in the proceeds payable under such contract or policy,
for the purpose and with the intent of effecting settlement of such claims,
loss, or damage under such contract or policy on less favorable terms than
those provided in, and contemplated by, such contract or policy. 27
In addition, any of these following actions encompass bad faith conduct if
they indicate a “general business practice”28 on the part of the insurer:
Failing to adopt and implement standards for the proper investigation
of claims.29
Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating
to coverages at issue.30
Failing to acknowledge and act promptly upon communications with
respect to claims.31
Denying claims without conducting reasonable investigations based
upon available information.32
Failing to affirm or deny full or partial coverage of claims, and, as to
partial coverage, the dollar amount or extent of coverage, or failing to provide a written statement that the claim is being investigated, upon the written request of an insured within 30 days after proof-of-loss statements have
been completed.33
Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation in writing to the
insured of the basis in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.34
Failing to promptly notify the insured of any additional information
necessary for the processing of a claim.35

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(1) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(2) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(a) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(b) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(c) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(d) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(e) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(f) (2022).
See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(g) (2022).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2022

5

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review, Vol. 6 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 5

22

B.E.T.R.

[Vol. 6 2022

Failing to clearly explain the nature of the requested information and
the reasons why such information is necessary. 36
A number of these specific practices have appeared within the context of crop
insurance claims as well.

III. A TAXONOMY OF CROP INSURANCE BAD FAITH CLAIMS
There are several ways in which a typical crop insurance bad faith claim may
arise. In some cases, there are problems with the adjusting process itself regarding
the claim. With this type of case, an insurer may be accused of recklessness or intentional misconduct with the methods of adjusting a claim. In other cases, an insurer and its representatives may face allegations of misrepresentations made to agricultural producers as to the insurability of a crop. Insurers may also face claims
the insurer or its representatives committed errors in the crop insurance application
process. Finally, in at least one case, an insurer faced claims they failed to properly
inspect a nursery for cold protection equipment prior to the insurance coverage taking effect.

A. Bad Faith in the Adjusting Process
The lack of interest in a fair and reasonable inspection of potential crop damage
during the loss adjustment process can certainly lead to the question of bad faith
liability. An excellent example of this took place in Moss v. American Alternative
Insurance Company.37 Cotton crops of the insured were covered by a crop hail policy which covered hail damage, but not that of rain, wind, or other weather events.38
On September 24, 2005, a storm passed through the area of the cotton crops and the
insured submitted an insurance claim for hail damage.39 Less than two weeks later,
on October 4, 2005, an insurance adjuster inspected the cotton fields on behalf of
the insurer.40 The key in the case was the insured’s testimony the adjuster allegedly
told him “I see no hail damage” without examining any of the cotton plants. 41 In
addition, the managing agent of the insurer apparently notified the producer the arbitration process was mandatory and binding, when the crop hail policy at issue
actually did not have such a term.42 Particularly in favor of the producer was the
testimony of two independent crop adjusters who formerly worked on behalf of the
insurer who testified in essence there was pressure by management to underestimate
losses in hail claims to minimize payments.43 With these facts, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas found that a reasonable jury could
find the insurer acted in bad faith, noting the testimony suggested “the adjusting
process was a sham designed to cover the fact that [insurer] never intended to pay
36. See Fla. Rev. Stat. 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(h) (2022).
37. See Moss v. American Alternative Insurance Corporation, Case No. 5:06CV00010 JLH, 2006 WL
3147438 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2006).
38. Id. at *1.
39. Id. at *2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at *5.
43. Id. at *7.
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[the insured’s] claim for hail damage regardless of whether the claim was meritorious.”44
Some crop insurance bad faith claims involving adjusting issues concern the
actual adjusting methods utilized by the insurer. In Boyd v. United Farm Mutual
Reinsurance Company, the individuals who were insured suffered damage to an
apple crop as a result of a hailstorm.45 The apple crop was covered by a crop hail
policy.46 The insureds asked the insurer’s adjuster to utilize a ladder to obtain samples from the tops of the trees, as well as the side of the trees. 47 However, the adjuster only examined apples which could be reached from the ground, an adjusting
technique which may possibly overlook where hail damage may be heavier (the top
of the tree).48 The insurer’s adjuster calculated a loss of $40,782.50.49 The insureds
hired their own independent adjuster who examined damage from the top and sides
of the trees, calculating a loss of $98,708.50
The jury in the case found in favor of the insureds. 51 On appeal, the Illinois
Court of Appeals stated the “plaintiffs were genuinely concerned with the proper
method to be used in determining loss and not simply with the end result.” 52 The
Illinois Court of Appeals also held the manifest weight of the evidence supported
the jury’s finding that the insurer acted vexatiously and unreasonably in the case. 53
Delays by the insurer in the adjusting of a claim can also lead to bad faith
liability. In the case of Bruhn Farms Joint Venture v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance
Company, the insured incurred a significant hail loss on September 11, 2012.54 The
adjustment process was not completed in the case until nearly two months later, on
November 5, 2012.55 The insured contended the delay from the date of loss (September 11, 2012) to the date the losses were adjusted (October 29, 2012) was unreasonable.56 In addition, the insured also contended the insurer’s failure to undertake negotiations regarding the amount of loss was unreasonable as well. 57 Despite
the insured’s arguments, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Iowa held the insurer was entitled to summary judgment on the bad faith claim.58
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bruhn Farms Joint Venture overturned
the summary judgment on appeal.59 The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals’ review of
the evidence yielded a different result, and the Court noted several instances of conduct raised jury questions of bad faith. “Most specifically the delay in adjusting the
fields and then, for the next several months, leading [insured] to believe that the
44. Id.
45. See Boyd v. United Farm Mutual Reinsurance Company, 596 N.E.2d 1344 (Ill. Ct. App. 5th Dist.
1992).
46. Id. at 1345.
47. Id. at 1346.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1349.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Bruhn Farms Joint Venture v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 103 F.Supp.3d 968, 972
(N.D. Iowa 2015).
55. Id. at 978.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 978-979.
59. See 823 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 2016).
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claim would be favorably settled without having to go through the hassle of a joint
appraisal.”60 Bruhn Farms Joint Venture illustrates that prolonged time delays in
the adjustment of a claim is a marker of potential bad faith.
Outside the Moss, Boyd and Bruhn Farms Joint Venture cases, the provisions
of the United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency’s Loss
Adjustment Manual Standards Handbook outline adjusting standards which, if violated, could constitute indicia of a bad faith claim. The Loss Adjustment Manual
Standards Handbook (LAM) outlines the standards for claims involving multi-peril
crop insurance.61 One of the primary duties of the insurer is to “ensure that the adjuster has necessary equipment, is trained in its operation, and that such equipment
is in proper working order to perform loss adjustment duties.” 62 This duty requires
a crop insurance adjuster be properly trained to adjust claims. This duty is especially
significant in a time when the federal crop insurance program has expanded beyond
covering traditional cash crops into organic agriculture.63 Thus, adjusters must be
familiar with organic crops and be aware of the many differences between a traditional crop and organic crop.
Specific to loss adjusting, a crop insurance adjuster has the obligation to “visit
farms for the purpose of inspecting damaged or destroyed crops during the growing
season or following harvest.”64 In addition, the insurer must “determine and/or verify any insured and uninsured causes of loss.” 65 These standards require adjusters
to actually visit the damaged crops at issue, actually inspect them, and determine if
an insured cause of loss is present. In the event that an adjuster doesn’t actually visit
the farm or visually inspect a loss, this failure certainly would constitute evidence
of bad faith conduct on the part of an insurer.

B. Bad Faith and Misrepresentations as to Crop Insurability
Allegations of misrepresentations with regard to insurability of a crop for
multi-peril crop insurance may also appear prominently in a potential bad faith
claim. As the Florida statute regarding unfair claims settlement practices specifically notes, misrepresentations as to “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to coverages at issue” can indicate bad faith misconduct on the part of an
insurer.
Allegations of negligent misrepresentation and intentional misrepresentation
arose in the case of Dixon v. Producers Agriculture Insurance Company.66 In the
Dixon case, a group of farmers were concerned about a requirement that for their
burley tobacco crops to be insurable through multi-peril crop insurance, they must
60. Id. at 1167.
61. See Loss Adjustment Manual Standards Handbook, 2021 and Succeeding Crop Years, United
States Department of Agriculture, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, FCIC-25010-1 (Mar. 15, 2021)
(hereinafter “Loss Adjustment Manual”).
62. Id. at pg. 7.
63. See Organic Crops, United States Department of Agriculture Risk Management Agency (2022),
available at
https://www.rma.usda.gov/en/Topics/Organic-Crops (last accessed Jan. 31, 2022).
64. See Loss Adjustment Manual, supra note 62 at p. 9.
65. Id.
66. See Dixon v. Producers Agriculture Insurance Company, 198 F.Supp.3d 832, 835 (M.D. Tenn.
2016).
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have planted an insurable crop on the land for one of the past three years prior to
obtaining insurance.67 The burley tobacco farmers attended a presentation by the
underwriting supervisor of the insurer who confirmed this requirement but also
noted that if the requirement wasn’t met the producers must obtain a written agreement from the Risk Management Agency to be eligible for multi-peril crop insurance.68
Later, that underwriting supervisor allegedly told two insurance agents that if
the burley tobacco farmers had raised a hay crop within the past three years, that
crop would be considered “insurable.”69 This was also confirmed in writing in an
email from the underwriting supervisor to the insurance agents.70 The insurance
agents communicated this information to the burley tobacco farmers, who obtained
multi-peril crop insurance for the burley tobacco crop.71
The burley tobacco crop incurred a crop loss during the 2010 crop year. 72 The
claims were originally paid by the insurer, but later the indemnity was requested
back after it was determined that the hay crop which had been planted on the land
within the past three years was actually not an insurable crop. 73
Under these facts, the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Tennessee denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, noting there was sufficient
evidence of a jury question that the insurer “knowingly misrepresented to the farmers that they could plant their tobacco crop and obtain coverage from [insurer] on
that crop without procuring a written agreement from the RMA.” 74
Similarly, allegations of misrepresentations as to the insurability of a crop appeared in the case of Pelzer v. ARMtech Insurance Services, Inc.75 In Pelzer, two
groups of farmers planted non-irrigated corn behind winter wheat in two Arkansas
counties.76 This occurred following a representation made by their crop insurance
agent that double-cropping would be insurable.77 The crop insurance agent allegedly received this representation from the national claims manager of the insurer. 78
Multi-peril crop insurance policies require farmers to follow “good farming
practices,” otherwise a claim is subject to denial. 79 In the Pelzer case, after the producers filed a crop loss claim, the insurer later denied the claim on the basis that
double-cropping was not a good farming practice.80 The RMA upheld the good
farming practices determination of the insurer on appeal.81
The agricultural producers brought claims of negligence, deceit, constructive
fraud and deceptive trade practices against the insurer.82 Similar to the fact issue in
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 834.
Id. at 834-835.
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 838.
See Pelzer v. ARMtech Insurance Services, Inc., 928 F.Supp.2d 1071 (E.D. Ark. 2013).
Id. at 1074.
Id.
Id.
See 7 C.F.R. § 457.8 para. (1).
See Pelzer v. ARMtech Insurance Services, Inc., 928 F.Supp.2d at 1075.
Id.
Id.
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the Dixon case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
found genuine questions of material fact could potentially be presented on the producers’ claims of negligence, deceit, constructive fraud and deceptive trade practices.83
While the Dixon and Pelzer cases primarily centered around allegations of negligent and/or fraudulent misrepresentation by the insurer, such misrepresentations
can constitute evidence of bad faith misconduct of an insurer generally on an insurance bad faith claim. Just like errors with insurability, an insurer’s errors with regard
to involvement in a crop insurance application process can also lead to potential
liability for bad faith.

C. Bad Faith and Errors in the Crop Insurance Application
Process
Such errors in the crop insurance application process arose in the case of Dailey
v. American Growers Insurance.84 In the Dailey case, a tobacco farmer had procured a multi-peril crop insurance policy through an insurance agent who also happened to be an employee of a tobacco warehouse that provided financing for the
tobacco farm’s operation.85 Thus, the warehouse had an interest in the crop that was
harvested each season, as the financing for the operation of the farm was paid for
by the tobacco harvest.86
The insurance agent in the Dailey case procured a higher level of insurance
coverage (75%) than the producer had under the prior year’s multi-peril crop insurance policy (55%).87 However, the insurance agent placed the insurance on the 75%
indemnity policy under the name of an uninsurable, unincorporated business entity
rather than the name of the insured.88 After a loss was incurred, the insurer provided
coverage only under the 55% indemnity policy and not the 75% indemnity policy.89
The insured alleged violations of Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act and generally contended that the claim was not adjusted in a fair, prompt
and reasonable manner.90 After summary judgment was granted to the insurer on
these claims, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the claims under the Kentucky’s Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act were not preempted by federal law
and thus the case was remanded back to the trial court.91

D. Failure to Inspect a Nursery Properly Prior to Crop Insurance Coverage Taking Effect
Finally, in at least one case, Moon Mountain Farms, LLC v. Rural Community
Insurance Services, an insurer was allegedly failed to properly inspect two nurseries
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1084.
See Dailey v. American Growers Insurance, 103 S.W.3d 60 (Ky. 2003).
Id. at 67.
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 66.
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(one in California, another in Arizona) prior to a multi-peril crop insurance policy
taking effect.92 The plant nursery policies excluded crop insurance coverage for cold
temperature loss in the event adequate cold weather protection equipment was not
installed and in adequate condition.93 The underwriting regulations for nursery
crops require an inspection prior to insurance taking effect and, if there are deficiencies in the cold weather equipment, the insurer is required to notify the insured
that a cold weather temperature claim may be denied.94
While an inspection was conducted by the insurer of both the Arizona and California nurseries, the inspection report for the Arizona nursery incorrectly reported
the insurer had adequate cold weather protection and in the case of the California
nursery, the insurer did not provide the report in writing to the insured pursuant to
the regulations.95
After claims for losses in the plant nurseries were denied, the insured filed a
demand for arbitration and was awarded $2,797,369.00 by the arbitrator. 96 Following the arbitration, the insured brought forward a number of claims in judicial review, including bad faith.97 The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. 98 The Moon Mountain
Farms case illustrates an insurer’s failure to conduct an adequate inspection for insurability, and failure to fully comply with regulations relating to the inspection,
can result in fact questions as to bad faith misconduct.

IV. A TAXONOMY OF CROP INSURANCE BAD FAITH DEFENSES
In bad faith cases where crop insurance claims are unsuccessful, three major
general defenses appear. One of the best defenses to bad faith is that the insurer
faced a “fairly debatable” claim and its actions with respect to an insurance claim
were not unreasonable.99 Another defense that has been present with multi-peril
crop insurance claims is the failure of an insured to comply with the arbitration
requirements of the common crop insurance policy. In addition, with respect to crop
insurance cases involving multi-peril crop insurance policies that are reinsured by
the federal government, preemption of state law claims by the Federal Crop Insurance Act is a defense that is asserted in a growing number of courts which have
found in favor of preemption. Finally, the provisions of the LAM Standards Handbook are analyzed, which provide potential arguments for insurers to make to defend crop insurance bad faith claims.

92. See Moon Mountain Farms v. Rural Community Insurance Company, Case No. CV-13-00349PHX-DJH, 2015 WL 12661935 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2015).
93. Id. at *2.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id. at *10.
99. See Gardner v. Hartford Insurance Accident & Indemnity Company, 659 N.W.2d 198, 206 (Iowa
2003) (“[The insurer] had the right to contest a claim for benefits that is “fairly debatable” without being
subject to a bad faith tort claim”).
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A. The Actions of the Insurer Are Not Unreasonable
In some cases, courts have found that an insurer’s actions relating to the handling of a claim are not unreasonable or oppressive. In Meyer v. Conlon, a dispute
arose between an agricultural producer and a multi-peril crop insurer regarding the
extent of damage to a bean crop after a hailstorm.100 The parties in the case dispute
whether the crop damage was a total loss and whether a representative of the insurer
made representations to the insured to believe that the insured had no insurance
coverage.101 The insured proceeded to salvage the crop and expended approximately $68,000 in his own funds to do so.102 Later that same year, the insured did
not remit payment of the premium for the policy and the insurer filed suit for the
premium in a trial court in Iowa.103 A default judgment was eventually entered
against him by the trial court in Iowa.104
The insured filed a lawsuit in federal court in Wyoming which included an
insurance bad faith claim in it.105 The trial court held that the circumstances of the
claim were “fairly debatable” and thus no bad faith was present. 106 With its review
on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit focused on the
point that the insured’s harvest actually was in excess of the production guarantee
under the crop insurance policy and thus no covered loss occurred.107 As to the factual circumstances surrounding the handling of the claim, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit noted that the although the insurer’s “handling of
this matter was hardly ideal, and contributed to the acrimony between the parties,
deviation from “best practices” or “industry standards” does not equate with the
type of reckless or intentional oppressive conduct required for this tort.” 108 Thus,
the Tenth Circuit found there was no evidence to support a jury question on insurance bad faith.109
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
did not find a crop insurer’s handling of a claim unreasonable in Vaughn v. Producers Agriculture Insurance Company.110 In the Vaughn case, the producers suffered
a freeze loss to cabbage crops in Florida.111 Fresh cabbage was insurable through a
multi-peril crop insurance policy, but not processing cabbage.112 After the claims
from the freeze loss were paid by the insurer, the insurer denied the claims after
identifying a document which outlined a contract for processing cabbage. 113 The
insurer then reported the insureds to the Risk Management Agency for suspected
misrepresentations, and eventually the indemnities were requested back by the

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Meyer v. Conlon, 162 F.3d 1264, 1266 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
See Vaughn v. Producers Agriculture Insurance Company, 111 F.Supp.3d 1251 (N.D. Fla. 2015).
Id. at 1256.
Id.
Id. at 1258.
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insurer.114 Eventually the insureds were placed on RMA’s “Ineligible Tracking System” list115 after the indemnities were not repaid.116
Following the denial of the claims, the producers pursued arbitration and were
successful at arbitration as the arbitrator concluded the intention of the producers
was to plant fresh market cabbage.117
A claim based upon insurance bad faith was eventually filed in federal court by
the insureds.118 With regard to the bad faith claim, the Court focused heavily on the
fact that a contract for processing cabbage raised questions as to the insurability of
the cabbage.119 In addition, with regard to the insureds being placed on the Ineligible
Tracking System list, the Court observed that federal crop insurance is highly regulated and “the terms of the policy make it clear that the parties’ rights and obligations are subject to the FCIC’s policies and procedures.”120 Under these regulations,
the Court noted that the insurer had an obligation to report the insureds to RMA.121
Under the circumstances, the Court found that a reasonable juror could not find bad
faith in the case and thus summary judgment on the bad faith claim was granted for
the insurer.122

B. Failure of an Insured to Comply with Arbitration Requirement
In some cases, a producer’s bad faith claim in the crop insurance context may
not proceed if the producer fails to adhere to the multi-peril crop insurance’s requirement for a producer to demand arbitration within one year of the date of claim
denial.123 A key takeaway from crop insurance litigation is there are many potential
procedural hurdles to pursue a claim and these hurdles, if not navigated correctly,
can result in a claim being denied.124
The procedural complexity of a crop insurance claim and bad faith defense appeared in Sunset Ranches, Inc. v. NAU Country Insurance Company.125 In the Sunset Ranches case, the producer’s claim for a loss to a cherry crop was denied on
July 17, 2014 due to the crop being destroyed without the consent of the insurer.126

114. Id. at 1259.
115. See Frequently Asked Questions – Ineligible Tracking System, USDA Risk Management Agency
(2022), available at https://legacy.rma.usda.gov/help/faq/its.html (last accessed Feb. 7, 2022) (“The Ineligible Tracking System (ITS) is a database that contains records of producers who are not eligible to
participate in any crop insurance programs insured or reinsured by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). When a producer applies for crop insurance, the insurance company automatically checks
the ITS for the producer’s eligibility. If it is determined that the producer is ineligible, the producer will
be notified and crop insurance coverage will not attach”).
116. See Vaughn v. Producers Agriculture Insurance Company, 111 F.Supp.3d at 1259.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1259-1260.
119. Id. at 1261.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1262.
122. Id. at 1262-1263.
123. See 7 C.F.R. § 457.8.
124. See generally J. Grant Ballard, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Litigation of Federally Reinsured
Crop Insurance Claims, 17 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 531 (2012).
125. See Sunset Ranches, Inc. v. NAU Country Insurance Company, Case No. F078916, 2021 WL
3614417 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. Aug. 16, 2021).
126. Id. at *3.
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The producer filed a lawsuit in California state court on March 27, 2015, including
claims based upon unfair trade practices.127
The insurer filed a motion to compel arbitration, which was granted by the trial
court on September 14, 2015.128 Less than one month later, on October 9, 2015, the
producer requested an arbitration.129 The arbitrator found that the producer failed to
leave the crop intact prior to the insurer’s inspection and appraisal. 130 Since the policy was not complied with as the crop was destroyed without the insurer’s consent,
the claim was properly denied.131
With regard to the producer’s request to vacate the arbitration decision in favor
of the insurer, the California Court of Appeals found that the producer clearly did
not comply with the arbitration requirement in the multi-peril crop insurance policy.132 The insurance policy clearly required the producer to request an arbitration
within one year of the claim denial.133 Since this did not occur, the producer could
not petition a state court to overturn the award.134 The dismissal of the unfair trade
practices act claims were upheld by the California Court of Appeals on preemption
grounds.135
The Sunset Ranches case illustrates that a failure to comply with the arbitration
requirement in the multi-peril crop insurance policy can potentially prove devastating to a bad faith claim. Had the producer in Sunset Ranches filed for arbitration
from the outset of the case, the right to appeal the arbitration decision could have
been potentially preserved. Although the bad faith claims would have likely been
dismissed anyway due to preemption grounds in this particular case, in the event
the Court in Sunset Ranches would have decided differently on the preemption issue, the arbitration decision would be much more relevant to the merits of a bad
faith claim.

C. Preemption Defense
Although a comprehensive discussion of preemption issues relating to crop insurance bad faith claims and the Federal Crop Insurance Act is beyond the scope of
this Article, in recent years federal preemption has been asserted in a number of bad
faith cases as a defense to liability. An early doctrinal rule developed which limited
preemption defenses in cases involving multi-peril crop insurance policies.136 Typical among these cases was Williams Farms of Homestead, Inc. v. Rain and Hail
Insurance Services, Inc., a seminal decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.137 In the Williams Farms case, three corporate potato farmers in south Florida brought a breach of contract claim against their multi-peril crop
insurer after receiving claim denials following losses to their potato crops in the
127. Id. at *5-6.
128. Id. at *6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *7.
131. Id.
132. Id. at *10-11.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *11.
135. Id. at *12.
136. Marzen, supra note 23, at 641-643.
137. See Williams Farms of Homestead, Inc. v. Rain and Hail Insurance Services, Inc., 121 F.3d 630
(11th Cir. 1997).
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wake of Tropical Storm Gordon.138 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams Farms held that the Federal Crop Insurance Act did not preempt state law
claims, specifically breach of contract claims, as “Congress did not draft the FCIA
to expressly preempt state law claims, nor does the wording of the statute or its
legislative history evince an intent to preempt state law claims.”139 Decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,140 United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,141 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,142 United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,143 Kentucky Supreme
Court,144 United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,145 United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, 146 United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee,147 United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan,148 United States District Court for the District of Minnesota,149 United States District Court for the District of North Dakota,150 United
States District Court for the District of South Carolina 151 and United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama152 have also held that the Federal Crop
Insurance Act does not preempt state law claims.
However, this doctrinal rule rejecting preemption of bad faith claims is eroding.
For example, in J.O.C. Farms, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that claims for breach of contract, bad faith
refusal to settle, and unfair settlement claims practices were preempted by the Federal Crop Insurance Act.153 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in J.O.C. Farms
relied largely upon154 a provision in the common crop insurance policy that states
that:
In judicial review only, you may recover attorneys fees or other expenses,
or any punitive, compensatory or any other damages from us only if you
obtain a determination from FCIC that we, our agent or loss adjuster failed
to comply with the terms of this policy or procedures issued by FCIC and

138. Id. at 632.
139. Id. at 634.
140. See Holman v. Laulo-Rowe Agency, 994 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1993).
141. See Alliance Insurance Company v. Wilson, 384 F.3d 547, 551-552 (8th Cir. 2004).
142. See Rio Grande Underwriters, Inc. v. Pitts Farms, Inc., 276 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 2001).
143. See Meyer v. Conlon, 162 F.3d 1264, 1268-1270 (10th Cir. 1998).
144. See Dailey v. American Growers Insurance, 103 S.W.3d 60, 66 (Ky. 2003).
145. See Bullard v. Southwest Crop Insurance Agency, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 531, 538 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
146. See Halfmann v. USAG Insurance Services, Inc., 118 F.Supp.2d 714, 718 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
147. See Wanamaker v. Lawson, 871 F.Supp.2d 735, 742 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).
148. See Hyzer v. Cigna Property Casualty Insurance Company, 884 F.Supp. 1146, 1149 (E.D. Mich.
1995).
149. See Agre v. Rain & Hail LLC, 196 F.Supp.2d 905, 912 (D. Minn. 2002).
150. See Bullinger v. Trebas, 245 F.Supp.2d 1060 (D. N.D. 2003).
151. See O’Neil v. Cigna Property Casualty Insurance Company, 878 F.Supp. 848, 852 (D. S.C. 1995).
152. See Horn v. Rural Community Insurance Services, 903 F.Supp. 1502, 1504 (M.D. Ala. 1995).
153. See J.O.C. Farms, L.L.C. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 737 Fed.Appx. 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2018) (“While the FCIA and FCIC regulations were not intended to completely foreclose state law
claims against private insurers providing policies reinsured by the FCIC, we agree with the weight of
recent authority recognizing that claims arising from an insurer’s determination under the policy are
preempted”).
154. Id. at 655.
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such failure resulted in you receiving a payment in an amount that is less
than the amount to which you were entitled.155
The Fourth Circuit in J.O.C. Farms read this provision to require a plaintiff to
first obtain an FCIC determination – in essence, the Fourth Circuit has read this
provision as a condition precedent necessary for a bad faith claim to move forward.156 In addition, recent decisions of the Tennessee Court of Appeals,157 California Court of Appeals,158 United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Washington,159 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee160 have also found preemption by the Federal Crop Insurance Act of state
law claims, exemplifying a growing recent trend finding preemption of state law
claims.
As multi-peril crop insurers assess claims based upon state common law or
state statutory bad faith mechanisms, the defense of preemption is one that may be
available to dismiss bad faith claims. However, it is important to note that this defense is available only to multi-peril crop insurers and not private crop-hail crop
insurance companies as the private crop-hail policies are not subject to the Federal
Crop Insurance Act.

D. Provisions of the Loss Adjustment Manual (LAM) Standards Handbook
Finally, with respect to multi-peril crop insurance policies, the failure of an
insured to comply with the responsibilities outlined in the LAM Standards Handbook could very well provide a defense to a crop insurer on a bad faith claim.
Recalling the situation which the insured encountered in the Sunset Ranches
case, obtaining consent from the insurer prior to destroying an insured crop, abandoning it, or placing the acreage to another use is required by the LAM Standards
Handbook.161 In addition, just as in other situations which sometimes arise in the
law generally, there is also a duty to mitigate damages.162 The LAM Standards
Handbook requires an insured to “protect the crop from further damage by providing sufficient care.”163

155. See 7 C.F.R. § 457.8 para. 20(i).
156. See J.O.C. Farms, L.L.C. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 737 Fed.Appx. at 655.
157. See Plants, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Case No. M2011-02274-COA-R3-CV,
2012 WL 3326295 at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 20212).
158. See Sunset Ranches, Inc. v. NAU Country Insurance Company, Case No. F078916, 2021 WL
3614417 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. Aug. 16, 2021).
159. See Farm Management Company, LLC v. Rural Community Insurance Agency, Inc., Case No.
14-CV-5024-EFS, 2015 WL 1809789 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 21, 2015).
160. See Wanamaker Nursery, Inc. v. John Deere Risk Protection, Inc., 364 F.Supp.3d 839, 849 (E.D.
Tenn. 2019).
161. See Loss Adjustment Manual, supra note 62.
162. See Borley Storage and Transfer Co., Inc. v. Whitted, 710 N.W.2d 71, 80 (Neb. 2006) (“Under
the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which is another name for the failure to mitigate damages, a
wronged party will be denied recovery for such losses as could reasonably have been avoided, although
such party will be allowed to recover any loss, injury, or expense incurred in reasonable efforts to minimize the injury”).
163. See Loss Adjustment Manual, supra note 62.
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Keeping detailed records is also a responsibility of the insured. Lack of recordkeeping could also provide a potential avenue for a defense in a crop insurance bad
faith claim. The LAM Standards Handbook specifically provides:
The insured must retain complete records of the planting, replanting, inputs, production, harvesting and disposition of the insured crop on each
unit for three years after the end of the crop year. This requirement also
applies to all such records for acreage that is not insured. The insured must
also provide those records upon the AIP’s request or the request of any
employee of USDA authorized to investigate or review any matter relating
to crop insurance.164
Finally, there is a duty of the insured to cooperate with the crop insurer regarding the claim investigation. Many insurance policies outside of the crop insurance
context include a cooperation clause which requires an insured to cooperate with an
insurer during the claims process. 165 The LAM Standards Handbook requires cooperation on the part of the insured with allowing the insurer to inspect the crops at
issue, take samples of the crops, and provide documents and records requested by
the insurer.166 The breach of cooperation by an insured can constitute evidence that
leads to a conclusion that an insurer acts reasonably with regard to claims handling
and not in bad faith.

V. CONCLUSION
As the future of food is considered not only by the distinguished scholars of
this symposium but is ensured by hardworking agricultural producers, a critical
public policy matter awaits the halls of Congress: the reauthorization of the federal
crop insurance program and the 2023 farm bill. As congressional debates surrounding the 2023 farm bill commence, crop insurance likely will have strong bipartisan
support.167 And as crop insurance continues to evolve and innovate, such as the Risk
Management Agency’s recent rollout of a micro-farm policy for small farmers who
typically sell their crops locally,168 crop insurance appears poised to remain a key
component of keeping food accessible, affordable and in abundance for humanity.

164. Id.
165. See e.g., Continental Casualty Company v. City of Jacksonville, 550 F.Supp.2d 1312 (M.D. Fla.
2007).
166. See Loss Adjustment Manual, supra note 62.
167. See Meredith Lee, The latest tug-of-war: Billions in farm subsidies and rural aid, POLITICO (Dec.
28, 2021), available at https://www.politico.com/news/2021/12/28/climate-disaster-relief-farm-billdemocrats-526183 (last accessed Jan. 24, 2022).
168. See Chuck Abbott, Micro-Farm Crop Insurance Policy Will Debut in 2022, SUCCESSFUL FARMING
(Dec. 1, 2021), available at https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/micro-farm-crop-insurance-policy-will-debut-in-2022 (last accessed Jan. 24, 2022). (“Small farmers who sell their products locally are
eligible for a new micro-farm policy, said the Risk Management Agency, which oversees the federally
subsidized crop insurance system. The policy, which simplifies recordkeeping and covers post-production costs, is available for 2022 crops”).
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